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Abstract: A game between a representative household and a government was analyzed. The
household chose which fractions of two currencies to hold, e.g., a national currency such as a Central
Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) and a global currency such as Bitcoin or Facebook’s Diem, and
chose the tax evasion probability for each currency. The government chose, for each currency, the
probability of detecting and prosecuting tax evasion, the tax rate, and the penalty factor imposed
on the household when tax evasion was successfully detected and prosecuted. The household′s
fraction of the national currency, the government’s monitoring probability of the national currency,
and the penalty factor imposed on the global currency, increased in the household′s Cobb Douglas
output elasticity for the national currency. The household′s probabilities of tax evasion on both
currencies increased in the government’s Cobb Douglas output elasticity for the national currency.
The government’s taxation on both currencies decreased in the output elasticity for the national
currency. High output elasticity for the national currency eventually induced the government to tax
that currency more than the global currency. The household′s probability of tax evasion on the global
currency increased in the government’s output elasticity for that currency. The household was less
(more) likely to tax evade on the national (global) currency if the government valued taxation and
penalty on the national (global) currency. The results are illustrated numerically where each of the
eight parameter values were varied relative to a benchmark.
Keywords: digital currency; cryptocurrency; CBDC; Bitcoin; game theory; taxation; household;
government
JEL Classification: C72; H26
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
Digital currencies are receiving increasing attention as central banks launch Cen-
tral Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) (https://cbdctracker.org/, retrieved 7 April 2021),
companies develop currencies (e.g., Facebook’s Diem), and individuals, institutions, and
others (e.g., Tesla, Grayscale, MicroStrategy, Square) buy Bitcoin and other cryptocurren-
cies. As of 7 April 2021, 9162 cryptocurrencies contributed to a market cap of $1.9 trillion
(https://coinmarketcap.com/, retrieved 7 April 2021).
Cryptocurrencies work via the distributed ledger technology or blockchain. Blockchain
is a decentralized technology spread across many nodes that manage and record transac-
tions. The transactions are stored in multiple nodes that are permanent, verifiable, and
unchangeable. Cryptocurrencies have no physical form, are typically not issued by a central
authority, and are controlled through networks with varying degrees of decentralization.
The first cryptocurrency was Bitcoin that emerged through the genesis block 3 January
2009 at 18:15:05 UTC.
Advantages of cryptocurrency included typical avoidance of inflation (e.g., through
a fixed limited supply for Bitcoin or burning coins for the Binance coin), self-governance,
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disintermediation (no central party), security, privacy, cost-effective transaction modes
(especially for cross borders payments), instant or quick, and 24/7/365 accessibility, etc.
Disadvantages of cryptocurrencies include possible use for illegal transactions (e.g., by
applying privacy coins such as Monero), challenges of market fluctuations, no security or
remedy in case of loss, limited scalability for some cryptocurrencies, etc.
Cryptocurrencies, and especially privacy coins like Monero, Verge, Zcash, etc., might
enable tax evasion, which challenges regulators. Households might correctly or incorrectly
assess and compare governments’ abilities to monitor storage and transactions and enforce
regulations for cryptocurrencies and government-issued currencies. Marian [1] suggests
that cryptocurrencies could replace tax havens as the weapon-of-choice for tax-evaders.
These developments induce households to determine what fractions of each currency
to hold, how to evade tax on each currency, and induce governments to determine how to
tax, monitor tax evasion, and punish tax evasion, on each currency.
1.2. Contribution
This article models a game between a representative household and a government.
The household chooses three strategies, i.e., the fractions to hold and the probabilities of
tax evasion for two currencies. The government chooses six strategies, i.e., tax rates, tax
monitoring, and punishments for tax evasion, for two currencies. The national currency
offers the most common usage within a nation, e.g., purchasing and selling goods and
services, paying taxes, and saving for retirement. The global currency generally offers
opportunities beyond the national borders, e.g., user autonomy, discretion, peer-to-peer
focus, and tax evasion.
The players’ choices cause the household to assess four fractions for each currency;
i.e., legally permitted for the household to keep, successful tax evasion, unsuccessful tax
evasion, and the tax fraction paid voluntarily. The household has a Cobb Douglas expected
utility with one output elasticity for each currency. The government has a Cobb Douglas
expected utility with four output elasticities, i.e., one output elasticity for each currency
reflecting its identification with the household, and one output elasticity for each currency
reflecting its preference for taxation and penalties on unsuccessful tax evasion.
This article proposes a new way to formulate the government’s utility. The government
represents its households. Hence, the government is to some extent assumed to identify
with each household, and benefits when the household benefits. The government also
benefits from the household paying taxes, and benefits from the household paying a penalty
when the government successfully monitors, and thus detects and prosecutes tax evasion.
The article analytically determines how eight parameters, intended to capture the
phenomenon, impact the players’ nine strategies and two expected utilities. Sensitivity
analysis shows the variation in the government’s monitoring probabilities, tax rates, penalty
factors, and expected utility, and the household′s fractions of the two currencies and
the probability of tax evasion for each currency, as each parameter value varies relative
to a benchmark. The results are discussed in terms of economic intuition and policy
implications. The article contributes to all four areas of the literature reviewed in the
next section.
1.3. Literature
The literature is divided into four areas, i.e., CBDC and cryptocurrencies, currency
competition, game theory analyses, and governmental taxation.
1.3.1. CBDC and Cryptocurrencies
This article relates to this literature by considering one national currency that can
be interpreted to be a CBDC and one global currency that can be interpreted to be a
cryptocurrency.
Blakstad and Allen [2] summarized the possibilities and risks offered by cryptocurren-
cies for central banks and individuals.
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Brunnermeier and Niepelt [3] developed a generic framework of money, liquidity,
seignories rents, and financial frictions. They provided sufficient conditions for the equiva-
lence of monetary systems. They proposed that the introduction of CBDC could reduce
run risk on banks, rather than increasing it.
Asimakopoulos et al. [4] developed a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model to assess the economic consequences of cryptocurrencies. Applying Bayesian
techniques using US and crypto markets monthly data for the period 2013:M6-2019:M3,
they found a strong substitution effect between the real balances of government currency
and the real balances of cryptocurrency.
Sapkota and Grobys [5] divided cryptocurrencies into privacy and non-privacy coins.
They explored whether asset market equilibria exist in the cryptocurrency markets. By
analyzing ten cryptocurrencies with the highest market capitalization in each submarket in
the 2016–2018 period, they found that privacy coins and non-privacy coins expressed two
distinct unrelated market equilibria.
Allen et al. [6] enumerated the fundamental technical design challenges facing CBDC
designers, with a particular focus on performance, privacy, and security. They summa-
rized the main potential benefits of CBDC, namely, efficiency, a broader tax base, flexible
monetary policy, payment backstop, and financial inclusion.
1.3.2. Currency Competition
This article relates to this literature by considering competition between one national
currency and one global currency, in the sense that each household chooses optimally how
much to hold of each.
Gandal and Halaburda [7] evaluated the impact of network effects on competition in
the cryptocurrency market. They found no winner-take-all effects in the early period since
November 2013 (when data collection started) until April 2014, but strong network effects
and winner-take-all dynamics from April 2014 until February 2016.
Benigno [8] stated that multiple currencies could compromise the primary function
of a central bank. Additionally, they found that with many competing currencies issued
by profit-maximizing actors, both the nominal interest rate and the inflation could not be
manipulated, but were instead determined by structural factors, such as the intertemporal
discount factor, the exit rate, and the fixed entry cost.
Fernández-Villaverde and Sanches [9] considered competition between privately is-
sued fiat currencies. They found that an equilibrium existed in which price stability was
consistent with competing private monies, and also, that a continuum of equilibrium tra-
jectories existed with the property, such that the value of private currencies monotonically
converged to zero.
Benigno et al. [10] evaluated a two-country economy with complete markets, two
national currencies, and a global cryptocurrency. They suggest that deviating from interest
rate equality might imply approaching the zero lower bound or the abandonment of
the national currency, referred to as Crypto-Enforced Monetary Policy Synchronization
(CEMPS). Hence, the impossibility of jointly ensuring a fixed exchange rate, free capital
flows, and an independent monetary policy (the classic Impossible Trinity) becomes even
less reconcilable.
1.3.3. Game Theory Analyses
This article relates to this literature by considering a game between a government and
a representative household.
Wang [11] set up a game theory model to analyze the implications of tax evasion for
the optimal design of CBDC. He discussed several scenarios where CBDC had different
anonymity compared to cash. For example, if CBDC offered less anonymity than cash,
introducing CBDC would decrease tax evasion. If CBDC provided a high level of anonymity
but low interest rate, then it would decrease the agents’ output. However, if CBDC
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offered low anonymity and a high interest rate, it would increase the output and aggregate
the welfare.
Zhang et al. [12] assessed the tax preferences of enterprise income for comprehensive
utilization of resources. They theoretically explored the game tax preference policy for
energy conservation and emission reduction. They found that increasing camouflage cost
and expected cost of risk could effectively prevent the generation of enterprise frauds.
Caginalp and Caginalp [13] determined the game theory equilibria for cryptocurren-
cies. The players divided their assets between the home currency and the cryptocurrency.
The government decided the probability of seizing a fraction of the players’ assets. The
conditions for existence and uniqueness of Nash equilibria were established.
Wang and Hausken [14] analyzed competition between a national currency and a
global currency, both of which had specific characteristics in an economy. The replicator
equation was used to illustrate how conventionalists (which prefer to be in the majority)
tend to compete against the pioneers and criminals (which prefer to be in the minority),
under various conditions.
Welburn and Hausken [15,16] theoretically analyzed the economic crises game, as-
suming six kinds of players, i.e., countries, central banks, banks, firms, households, and
financial inter-governmental organizations. Players have strategies such as setting inter-
est rates, lending, borrowing, producing, consuming, investing, importing, exporting,
defaulting, and penalizing default.
1.3.4. Taxation
This article related to this literature by considering how a government taxes, moni-
tors, and punishes tax evasion, and how a representative household might evade tax on
two currencies.
Reviews
Alm [17] reviewed how to measure, explain, and control tax evasion. The exam-
ples were to analyze shadow economies, experimental methods, survey evidence, assess
currency demand, and trace evasion in transactions financed by currencies.
Andreoni et al. [18] theoretically and empirically reviewed the literature on tax com-
pliance. They pointed out that the theoretical models only served as rough guides for
empirical research. They recommended more work on exploring the psychological, moral,
and social impacts on tax compliance activities, more attention to the dynamic and com-
plex institutional framework of tax compliance, and more empirical research outside the
USA jurisdiction.
Governmental Taxation
Brito et al. [19] analyzed the optimal income tax problem when consumers work
for many periods. The results indicated that when the government commits to future
tax schedules, intertemporal nonstationary tax schedules could relax the self-selection
constraints and lead to Pareto improvements.
Lai and Liao [20] investigated the optimal capital income taxation in heterogeneous
agent economies, featuring endogenous government spending. They pointed out that the
long-run optimal capital tax rate should not be zero when the competitive equilibrium
risk-free interest rate differed from the subjective time discount rate. The results could be
extended to a wide range of model economies.
Liu [21] explored how government preferences affected the choices of capital tax
rates in the presence of tax competition. The article suggests that countries emphasizing
economic development tend to choose lower corporate income tax rates than countries
emphasizing regional equality.
Raurich [22] developed an endogenous growth model with an endogenous labor
supply. He pointed out that the dynamic equilibrium might exhibit local indeterminacy
when labor income is heavily taxed.
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Economides et al. [23] presented a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth
with productive and non-productive public goods and services. They solved for Ramsey
second-best optimal policy. The findings differed from the benchmark case of the social
planner’s first-best allocation and depended crucially on whether public goods and services
were subject to congestion.
Chen and Guo [24] explored the theoretical interrelations between progressive income
taxation and macroeconomic (in)stability. The results showed that progressive taxation
operated like an automatic destabilizer that generated equilibrium indeterminacy and
belief-driven fluctuations in the economy, which differed from traditional Keynesian-type
stabilization policies.
Bacchetta and Perazzi [25] discussed a monetary reform in Switzerland. Based on
a simple infinite-horizon open-economy model, they pointed out that a tradeoff existed
between a reduction in distortionary labor taxes and an increase in the opportunity cost of
holding money.
Tax Evasion and Punishment
Becker [26] and Hausken and Moxnes [27] recommended optimal public and private
policies to combat illegal behavior. They showed that optimal enforcement depended on
the cost of catching and convicting offenders, the nature of punishments, and the responses
of offenders to changes in enforcement. Similarly, this article showed how households
responded to punishments for tax evasion.
Allingham and Sandmo [28] explored static and dynamic aspects of the taxpayer’s
decisions on tax evasion. In the static model, they found that the penalty rate and the prob-
ability of detection were substitutes for each other. In the dynamic analysis, they showed
that consistent rational individuals always declared more taxes than myopic short-sighted
tax-evading individuals. Extending Allingham and Sandmo’s [28] work, Yitzhaki [29]
showed that if a penalty was imposed on the evaded tax, no contradiction existed be-
tween an income and a substitution effect. Furthermore, if the taxpayer had absolute risk
aversion, which decreased with income, increased taxation causes decreased tax evasion.
This article supported the finding, when varying how the government identified with the
household′s output elasticity for the national currency (see Section 4) and when varying
the government’s elasticity for the national currency, when valuing taxation and penalty
on unsuccessful tax evasion (see Section 4), and otherwise supported the opposite result or
that one variable did not vary when the other variable varied.
Myles and Naylor [30] set out a model of tax evasion that captured a benefit of
conforming with non-evaders and of adhering to the social custom of non-evasion. They
showed that both equilibria with no evasion and with taxpayers choosing to evade could
exist. Similarly, this article showed how households might respond differently to the
government’s taxation, monitoring, and punishment.
Slemrod and Yitzhaki [31] presented theoretical models that integrate tax avoid-
ance and evasion into the overall decision problem faced by taxpayers. They also de-
veloped a taxonomy of efficiency costs and introduced a general theory of optimal tax
systems. They found that when the tax structure changed, individuals might change their
consumption basket.
Experimental Work on Tax Evasion
Torgler [32] summarized experimental findings on tax morale and tax compliance,
focusing on personal income tax morale, and social and institutional factors. He argued for
the infeasibility of testing the predictions of the level of tax compliance models. In addition,
social and institutional factors were important factors on tax compliance.
Kleven et al. [33] presented a tax enforcement field experiment in Denmark. They
found that tax evasion was near zero for income subject to third-party reporting, and was
much higher for self-reported income. In addition, marginal tax rates impacted tax evasion
positively for self-reported income, but the effect was small compared to legal avoidance
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and behavioral responses. Additionally, prior audits and threat-of-audit letters significantly
impacted self-reported income, but did not impact third-party reported income.
Empirical Work on Tax Evasion
Ariyo and William [34] estimated that for 1975–2010, 42.54–79.32% of the Nigerian un-
derground economy and tax evasion constituted 2.09–6.75% of the Gross Domestic Product.
Bittencourt et al. [35] found for 150 cases that less (more) financial development and a
more (less) inflation caused a bigger (smaller) shadow economy with related tax evasion,
during 1980–2009.
Hanlon et al. [36] assessed “round tripping” tax evasion where funds in offshore
tax havens were invested in U.S. securities markets. They found that the incentives to
evade U.S. taxation and expected costs of evasion detection affected the amount of foreign
portfolio investment in U.S. debt and equity markets.
Tax Morale and Alternatives to Expected Utility Theory
Luttmer and Singhal [37] pointed out that apart from tax tools like tax rate, detection
probality, and penalties imposed if evasion was detected, tax morale including nonpe-
cuniary motivations were important factors in tax compliance decisions. Drawing on
evidence from experiments, they demonstrated that tax morale operated through many
underlying mechanisms.
Dhami and al-Nowaihi [38] contended that the expected utility theory failed to explain
tax evasion activities. They found that the cumulative prospect theory provided a much
more satisfactory explanation of tax evasion.
1.4. Article Organization
Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 analyzes the model. Section 4 illustrates
the solution. Section 5 discusses the results and provides economic intuition and policy
implications. Section 6 concludes.
2. The Model
2.1. Two Currencies n and g
Appendix A shows the nomenclature. Consider an economy with two available
currencies. The first currency n is national and offers the most common usage, and
especially legal usage, within the economy. Examples of usage were for making various
purchases or paying taxes. The government has complete control and dominance over the
national currency n, e.g., by adjusting tax rates and inflation. We can think of the currency
n as a CBDC. The second currency g is global and outside the control of the government.
It offers more limited usage, e.g., cannot be used for all kinds of purchases, but offers
other opportunities, e.g., user autonomy, discretion, peer-to-peer focus, no banking fees,
tax evasion, black market payments, criminal activities, and a potentially high return. We
might think of currency g as a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, Zcash, or Facebook’s Diem.
The household pays taxes for holding the two currencies, and can choose tax evasion
with a probability for each currency. If tax evasion is detected and prosecuted by the gov-
ernment, the household has to pay a penalty. Owing to the features of the two currencies,
the probabilities of tax evasion, tax rates, probabilities of detecting tax evasion, and penalty
factors if tax evasion is detected, generally differ. Figure 1 illustrates the two currencies n
and g.
Games 2021, 12, 34 7 of 24
Games 2021, 12, x FOR PEER REVIEW 7 of 26 
 
 
evasion, black market payments, criminal activities, and a potentially high return. We 
might think of currency 𝑔 as a cryptocurrency such as Bitcoin, Zcash, or Facebook’s Diem. 
The household pays taxes for holding the two currencies, and can choose tax evasion 
with a probability for each currency. If tax evasion is detected and prosecuted by the gov-
ernment, the household has to pay a penalty. Owing to the features of the two currencies, 
the probabilities of tax evasion, tax rates, probabilities of detecting tax evasion, and pen-
alty factors if tax evasion is detected, generally differ. Figure 1 illustrates the two curren-
cies 𝑛 and 𝑔. 
 
Figure 1. An economy with two currencies 𝑛 and 𝑔. 
2.2. Two Kinds of Players: Households and One Government 
Consider an economy with a representative household and a government. The 
household chooses the fraction to hold currency 𝑛, causing the remaining fraction to be 
held in currency 𝑔, and chooses the tax evasion probability for each currency. The gov-
ernment is the second player. It completely controls the national currency 𝑛, but has no 
control of the global currency 𝑔. However, the government can set the tax rates, the prob-
abilities of detecting tax evasion, and the penalty factors if tax evasion is detected, for both 
currencies. We consider a non-cooperative one-period game. The households and govern-
ment choose their strategies simultaneously and independently. The players are inter-
linked as in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The government and a representative household involved in a national currency 𝑛 and a global currency 𝑔. 
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2.2. T o inds of Players: ouseholds and ne overn ent
onsider an economy with a representative household and a government. The house-
hold chooses the fraction to hold currency n, causing the remaining fraction to be held in
currency g, and chooses the tax evasion probability for each currency. The government
is the second player. It completely controls the national currency n, but has no control of
the global currency g. However, the government can set the tax rates, the probabilities of
detecting tax evasion, and the penalty factors if tax evasion is detected, for both curren-
cies. We consider a non-cooperative one-period game. The households and government
choose their strategies simultaneously and independently. The players are interlinked as in
Figure 2.
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Figure 2. The government and a representative household involved in a national currency n and a global currency g.
2.3. The Players’ Strategic Choices
The representative household simultaneously chooses three strategies to maximize its
expected utility U. It chooses its fraction x, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1 of currency n, causing the remaining
fraction 1− x to be held in currency g. Additionally, it chooses the tax evasion probability
pj, 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1, for currency j, j = n, g.
The government chooses six strategies simultaneously to maximize its expected utility
u. It chooses the probability mj, 0 ≤ mj ≤ 1 of detecting and prosecuting tax evasion on
currency j. Additionally, it chooses the tax rate τj, τj ≥ 0 for currency j. Finally, it chooses
the penalty factor Pj, Pj ≥ 0, imposed on each household when tax evasion is successfully
detected and prosecuted on currency j, j = n, g. Table 1 shows the players’ strategies
descriptions and strategy sets.
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Table 1. Player descriptions and strategy sets.
Player Strategies Description Strategy Set
A representative household
Chooses its fraction x, 0 < x ≤ 1, of currency n, causing the
remaining fraction 1− x, to be held in currency g.
Chooses the tax evasion probability pn for currency n and tax evasion





Chooses the probability mj,0 ≤ mj ≤ 1, of detecting and prosecuting
tax evasion on currency j.
Chooses the tax rate τj, τj ≥ 0, for currency j.
Chooses the penalty factor Pj, Pj ≥ 0, imposed on each household
when tax evasion is successfully detected and prosecuted on currency





2.4. The Household’s Strategies and Expected Utility
Assume that a representative household evades taxes on currency j with probability pj,
0 ≤ pj ≤ 1, j = n, g, which is detected and prosecuted by the government with probability
mj, 0 ≤ mj ≤ 1. With a tax rate τj, 0 ≤ τj ≤ 1, for currency j, the household’s expected




τj, paid voluntarily. With zero government
detection mj = 0, the household’s expected income fraction from tax evasion on currency j
is pjτj. With 100% government detection and prosecution mj = 1, the household’s expected
income fraction from tax evasion on currency j is 0. Generally, the household’s expected




pjτj, i.e., successful tax evasion.
Hence, the household’s expected expense fraction without penalty from unsuccessful tax
evasion on currency j is mj pjτj. We assume that the government penalizes unsuccessful
tax evasion by adjusting mj pjτj in two ways. First, mj pjτj is multiplied with a penalty
factor Pj, Pj ≥ 0, chosen by the government as a free choice variable. Second, Pjmj pjτj is
assumed to depend on the representative household’s tax evasion probability pj in a more
flexible manner by replacing pj with p
λj
j , where pj is a parameter, which gives mjτjPj p
λj
j
as the household’s expense from unsuccessful tax evasion. We require λj ≥ 0 since the
household’s expected expense for tax evasion should increase as the household’s tax






/pj ≥ 0. Tax evasion should not be beneficial.
We might interpret Pj p
λj−1
j as the government’s penalty, which is multiplied with the
household’s expected expense fraction mj pjτj from unsuccessful tax evasion on currency j,
to give mjτjPj p
λj
j . Hence, the household keeps a fraction







of currency j, which is multiplied with the fraction x of currency n, and multiplied with
the fraction 1− x of currency g, to determine how much of the two currencies n and g the





, and is otherwise negative.
We apply the Cobb Douglas expected utility for both players, since it is widely used
within economics and since it explicitly captures tradeoff players strike between multiple
conflicting or partly conflicting objectives. For the household that includes which currencies
to hold and with which probabilities to tax evade, assume that the household has a Cobb
Douglas expected utility with output elasticity α, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, associated with currency n,
and 1− α associated with currency g, i.e.,

























, j = n, g
0 otherwise
(2)
where U = 0 means that the penalty factor Pj is so high that the household goes into debt.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. The household’s three free choice variables are its fraction x
of currency n, which causes the remaining fraction 1− x to be held in currency g, and its
tax evasion probability pj for currency j, j = n, g.




Figure 3. Fractions 𝑥 and 1 − 𝑥 of the household’s currencies 𝑛 and 𝑔, each divided into four subgroup fractions, i.e., 1 − 𝜏  as legally permitted for the household to keep, 1 − 𝑚 𝑝 𝜏  as successful tax evasion, 𝑚 𝑝 𝜏  as unsuccessful tax 
evasion, and 1 − 𝑝 𝜏  as the tax fraction paid voluntarily, 𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑔. 
2.5. The Government’s Strategies and Expected Utility 
The challenge in modeling the government is that it cannot identify 100% with each 
household individually, because of the collective action dilemma, including the objective 
of maximizing the expected utility or welfare of all households. The government also can-
not minimize the expected utility of each household since then it will not be reelected. 
Hence, we assume that the government to some extent identifies with and represents each 
household, and benefits when the household benefits. A straightforward way of accom-
plishing that objective is to incorporate the household’s expected utility 𝑈 in Equation (2) 
into the government’s expected utility 𝑢. That implicitly means that the government to 
some extent, as determined by the parameters and the players’ strategic choices, internal-
izes all advantages of the household, including the advantage of evading taxes for the 
household. Since internalizing that advantage cannot be taken too far, we assume that the 
government also benefits from the household paying taxes, and benefits from the house-
hold paying a penalty when the government successfully monitors, and thus detects and 
prosecutes tax evasion. The government finally has a cost expenditure of choosing the 
monitoring probability 𝑚 , 𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑔. These multiple conflicting or partly conflicting objec-
tives of the government are obtained by assuming a more extensive Cobb Douglas ex-
pected utility for the government, expressed per household as 
Figure 3. Fractions x and 1− x of the household’s currencies n and g, each divided into four subgroup fractions, i.e., 1− τj









τj as the tax fraction paid voluntarily, j = n, g.
The output elasticities α and 1− α for the two currencies n and g account in a deep
sense for the benefits and costs of holding, acquiring, and transacting with the two cur-
rencies. Cryptocurrencies are freely available. Once acquired, no costs exist of holding
them, and interest might be earned. If we think of currency g as Bitcoin, these benefits and
costs changed since the genesis block in 2009. The early Bitcoin adopters operated in a seg-
mented market, possessing competence beyond the majority of households. Over the last
years, the market has broadened, become less segmented, is more easily accessible through
multiple entry points, and is mor user-friendly. Us rs learned to use crypto wallets, which
are of five types—m bile, desktop, paper, hardware, online, and mobile walle s. Users
operate on platforms a d exchanges such as ImT ken, M tamask TrustWallet, Tok nPlus,
Binance, OKEx, Huobi, Coinbase, etc. Users download apps such as Abra from the internet
on their cellphone, and create their own cryptocurrency addresses, where they buy, sell,
exchange, and earn interest on cryptocurrencies. Buying cryptocurrencies has become simi-
lar to buying stocks and is almost costless. Cryptocurrencies are gradually incorporated
into the conventional financial system, exemplified with Paypal, which currently offers
Bitcoin, Bitcoin Cash, Ethereum, and Litecoin. To the extent the representative household
perceives holding a global currency g such as Bitcoin as less straightforward than holding a
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government-issued national currency n, the household assigns lower output elasticity 1− α
to the global currency g, and thus higher output elasticity α to the national currency n.
2.5. The Government’s Strategies and Expected Utility
The challenge in modeling the government is that it cannot identify 100% with each
household individually, because of the collective action dilemma, including the objective of
maximizing the expected utility or welfare of all households. The government also cannot
minimize the expected utility of each household since then it will not be reelected. Hence,
we assume that the government to some extent identifies with and represents each house-
hold, and benefits when the household benefits. A straightforward way of accomplishing
that objective is to incorporate the household’s expected utility U in Equation (2) into
the government’s expected utility u. That implicitly means that the government to some
extent, as determined by the parameters and the players’ strategic choices, internalizes all
advantages of the household, including the advantage of evading taxes for the household.
Since internalizing that advantage cannot be taken too far, we assume that the government
also benefits from the household paying taxes, and benefits from the household paying
a penalty when the government successfully monitors, and thus detects and prosecutes
tax evasion. The government finally has a cost expenditure of choosing the monitoring
probability mj, j = n, g. These multiple conflicting or partly conflicting objectives of the
government are obtained by assuming a more extensive Cobb Douglas expected utility for









































, j = n, g
0 otherwise
(3)
which has four multiplicative terms. The first two terms in Equation (3) are equivalent
to the two terms in Equation (2), except that α and 1− α are replaced with βn and βg,
respectively, 0 ≤ βn, βg ≤ 1. That replacement means that although the government
identifies with the household, the government is enabled to prioritize differently and
have other output elasticities for the two currencies n and g than the household. For the
special case when the government has the same ratio α/(1− α) = βn/βg between the two





⇔ α = βn
βn + βg
(4)
which we do not require the government to adhere to. The third and fourth terms in
Equation (3), for currencies n and g, respectively, express that the government maximizes
the sum of two terms and a subtracted third term raised to the output elasticities γn and
1− βn− βg−γn, respectively, 0 ≤ γn ≤ 1, 0 ≤ 1− βn− βg−γn ≤ 1, for currencies n and g.
Term 1 is the household’s tax fraction paid voluntarily, multiplied with the currency fraction,




τg(1− x), for currencies n and g, respectively. Term 2 is the
household’s unsuccessful tax evasion multiplied with the penalty and currency fraction,
i.e., mnτnPn pλnn x and mgτgPg p
λg
g (1− x), for currencies n and g, respectively. Term 3 is the
household’s unit cost aj, aj ≥ 0, of choosing the monitoring probability mj, multiplied with
mj, j = n, g. Since mj is a probability, the unit cost aj has to be scaled so that 0 ≤ mj ≤ 1.
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The government’s six free choice variables are its probability mj of detecting and
prosecuting tax evasion on currency j, the tax rate τj on currency j, and the penalty factor Pj
imposed on each household when tax evasion is successfully detected and prosecuted on
currency j, j = n, g. The government and each household choose their free choice variables
simultaneously and independently. Analyzing such a stationary situation reflects reality in
the sense that governments in general, and households over time, adapt their preferences
and strategies to each other, making it difficult to state that one player chooses a strategy
over some other player.
3. Analyzing the Model
3.1. Analyzing the Household
Appendix B shows that the household chooses to hold the fraction
x =





, j = n, g
undetermined otherwise
(5)











and 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1, j = n, g
undetermined or 1 otherwise
(6)
of tax evasion on currency j, j = n, g.
3.2. Analyzing the Government
Appendix C shows that the government chooses the free choice variables
mn = xan , mg =
1−x
ag , τn =
γn













0 ≤ mn ≤ 1⇔ an ≥ x , 0 ≤ mg ≤ 1⇔ ag ≥ 1− x , 0 ≤ τn ≤ 1⇔ 0 ≤ pn ≤ βnβn+γn ,




3.3. Analyzing the Household and Government Together
Property 1. The household’s and the government’s strategies are







mn = αan , mg =
1−α



















U = u = 0, an ≥ α, ag ≥ 1− α, 0 ≤ λj ≤ 1, j = n, g
(8)
Proof. Appendix D. 
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0, ∂τg∂βg ≤ 0,
∂Pg
∂βg
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= 0. (8): ∂mg∂ag ≤ 0,
∂2mg
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= ∂Pn∂ag = 0.
Proof. Follows from Equations (A12)–(A19) in Appendix E. 
Property 2 states that, first, the household’s fraction x of currency n, the government’s
monitoring probability mn of currency n, and the government’s penalty factor Pg imposed
on each household’s holding of currency g, increase linearly, linearly, and convexly in the
household’s output elasticity α for currency n. Conversely, the household’s fraction 1− x
of currency g, the government’s monitoring probability mg of currency g, and the govern-
ment’s penalty factor Pn imposed on each household’s holding of currency n, decrease
linearly, linearly, and convexly in α. The remaining variables are independent of α.
Second and third, the household’s probability pj of tax evasion on currency j and the
government’s taxation τj on currency j increase concavely and linearly, respectively, in the
exponential tax evasion parameter λj. The remaining variables except Pj are independent
of λj, j = n, g.
Fourth, the household’s probabilities pn and pg of tax evasion on currencies n and g
increase linearly and convexly in the government’s output elasticity βn for currency n. The
government’s taxation τn and τg on currencies n and g decrease concavely and convexly
in βn. This decrease follows since increasing βn causes the government to identify more
strongly with the household in Equation (3), and the household prefers low taxation. That
the decrease is concave versus convex follows since high output elasticity βn for currency
n eventually induces the government to tax currency n more than currency g. Furthermore,
higher βn means lower output elasticity 1− βn − βg − γn for the fourth term in Equation
(3), which expresses lower government weight assigned to income from taxation and
penalty on tax evasion associated with currency g. The government’s penalty factors Pn
and Pg imposed on each household’s holding of currencies n and g increase concavely and
convexly in βn. The remaining variables are independent of βn.
Fifth, the household’s probability pg of tax evasion on currency g increases convexly in
the government’s output elasticity βg for the same currency g, as currency g becomes more
valuable for the household. The government’s taxation τg on currency g decreases linearly
in βg, as the government identifies more strongly with the household and thus prefers
to impose fewer costs on the household. The government’s penalty factor Pg imposed
on each household’s holding of currency g increases convexly in βg, as the government
seeks to curtail the household’s probability pg of tax evasion on currency g. The remaining
variables are independent of βg.
Sixth, the household’s probabilities pn and pg of tax evasion on currencies n and g
decreases concavely and increases convexly in the government’s output elasticity γn for
currency n when valuing taxation τn and valuing penalty Pn on unsuccessful tax evasion
on currency n. Thus, the household is less (more) likely to evade tax on currency n (g) if
the government values taxation τn (τg) and penalty Pn (Pg). The government’s taxation
τn and τg on currencies n and g increases concavely and decreases convexly in γn. The
increase follows since increasing γn causes the government to identify less strongly with the
household’s preference for low taxation τn on currency n, and instead to value taxation τn
and penalty Pn. The decrease follows, conversely, since the government’s higher valuation
of taxation τn and penalty Pn on currency n implies a lower valuation of taxation τg
and penalty Pg on currency g. The government’s penalty factors Pn and Pg imposed on
each household’s holding of currencies n and g which decreases concavely and increases
convexly in γn. The remaining variables are independent of γn.
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Seventh and eighth, the government’s monitoring probability mj of currency j de-
creases concavely in the unit cost aj of choosing mj, while the government’s penalty factor
Pj imposed on each household’s holding of currency j increases linearly. The remaining
variables are independent of aj. The remaining variables are independent of aj, j = n, g.
4. Illustrating the Solution
To illustrate the solution in Property 1 in Section 3.3, this section alters the eight param-
eter values α,λn, λg,βn, γn,βg,an, ag relative to the benchmark parameter values α = 4/5,
λn = λg = 1/5, βn = γn = 2/5, βg = 1/10, an = ag = 1.
First, α = 4/5 reflects that the national currency n might be more common than
the global currency g, in this illustration, four times more common. Second and third,
λn = λg = 1/5 express that the household’s expense mjτjPj p
λj
j from unsuccessful tax
evasion increases concavely in the representative household’s tax evasion probability pj.
Fourth, fifth, and sixth, βn = γn = 2/5 = α/2 and βg = (1− α)/2 = 1/10 preserve
the same ratio α/(1− α) = βn/βg = γn/
(
1− βn − βg − γn
)
= 4 for how the household
and government assign output elasticities to the national currency n versus the global
currency g. That is, both the household and the government assign a four times higher
output elasticity to currency n than to currency g in their Cobb Douglas expected utilities
U and u, and the government does so for both first terms in Equation (3) pertaining to its
identification with the household, and for the last two terms in Equation (3) pertaining
to how the government benefits from taxation income and income from the household’s
penalty payment from unsuccessful tax evasion. Seventh and eighth, the government’s
unit effort costs an = ag = 1 of choosing the monitoring probability mj are the simplest
possible benchmarks that satisfy an ≥ α and ag ≥ 1− α. In Figure 4, each of the eight
parameter values is altered from its benchmark, while the other seven parameter values
are kept at their benchmarks. Division of Pj with 20 is for scaling purposes.
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Figure 4. The government’s monitoring probability mj, taxation τj, penalty factor Pj, and expected utility u, and the
household’s fractions x and 1− x of currencies n and g, probability pj of tax evasion on currency j, and expected util-
ity U, as functions of the eight parameter values α,λn, λg,βn, γn,βg,an, ag relative to the benchmark parameter values
α = 4/5, λn = λg = 1/5, βn = γn = 2/5, βg = 1/10, an = ag = 1. The eight double panels, for the eight parameters
α,λn, λg,βn, γn,βg,an, ag, are referred to as (a,a′); (b,b′); (c,c′); (d,d′); (e,e′); (f,f′); (g,g′); and (h,h′). Division of Pj with 20 is
for scaling purposes, j = n, g.
In Figure 4a,a′, as the household’s output elasticity α for currency n increases, the
household’s fraction x of currency n increases linearly, the government’s monitoring proba-
bility mn of currency n increases linearly, and the government’s penalty factor Pg imposed
on each household’s holding of currency g increases convexly; while the household’s
fraction 1− x of currency g decreases linearly, the government’s monitoring probability
mg of currency g decreases linearly, and the government’s penalty factor Pn imposed on
each household’s holding of currency n decreases convexly; and the remaining variables
are constant.
In Figure 4b,b′,c,c′, as the exponential tax evasion parameter λj increases, the house-
hold’s ili pj of tax evasion on currency j increases concavely, and the gov rnm nt’s
taxation τj on currency j increases linearly; the governm nt’s pe alty factor Pj imposed on
each household’s lding of currency j is relativel con tant, and the remaining variabl s
are constant, j = n, g.
In i r , ′, r e t’s output elasticity βn for currency n increas s, the
ousehold’s probabilities pn and pg of tax ev sion on currencies and g increase lin rly
a d convexly, and the government’s taxation τn and τg o currencies n and g decrease
concavely and convexly. That causes taxation τg to be quite low when βn is high, since
the government then taxes currency n more than currency g. Furthermore, increasing βn
causes the government’s penalty factors Pn and Pg imposed on each household’s holding
of currencies n and g to increase concavely and convexly, and the remaining variables
are constant.
In Figure 4e,e′, as the government’s output elasticity βg for currency g increases, the
household’s probability pg of tax evasion on currency g increases convexly, the govern-
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ment’s taxation τg on currency g decreases linearly, and the government’s penalty factor
Pg imposed on each household’s holding of currency g increases convexly. The remaining
variables are constant.
In Figure 4f,f′, as the government’s output elasticity γn for currency n when valuing
taxation τn and valuing penalty Pn on unsuccessful tax evasion on currency n increases, the
household’s probabilities pn and pg of tax evasion on currencies n and g decreases concavely
and increases convexly. Furthermore, as γn increases, the government’s taxation τn and
τg on currencies n and g increases concavely and decreases convexly, the government’s
penalty factors Pn and Pg imposed on each household’s holding of currencies n and g
decreases concavely and increases convexly, and the remaining variables are constant.
In Figure 4g,g′,4h,h′, as the government’s unit cost aj of choosing the monitoring prob-
ability mj of currency j increases, the government’s monitoring probability mj of currency
j decreases concavely, the government’s penalty factor Pj imposed on each household’s
holding of currency j increases linearly, and the remaining variables are constant, j = n, g.
5. Discussion, Economic Intuition, and Policy Implications
Eight results in the previous section are particularly noteworthy. First, the household’s
fraction x of the national currency n, the government’s monitoring probability mn of the
national currency n, and the penalty factor Pg imposed on holding the global currency
g, increase linearly, linearly, and convexly in the household’s output elasticity α for the
national currency n. It is assumed that as one currency becomes more important, valuable,
and useful for the household, it holds more of it, which causes the government to monitor
it more thoroughly. More extensive monitoring of one currency is accompanied with a
lower penalty factor for that currency, and a higher penalty factor for the other currency.
This inverse correlation between monitoring mj and the penalty factor Pj, shown in
mboxfigfig:games-1159039-f004a,a′, causes the household to choose a constant probability
pj of tax evasion on currency j. The policy implication is that governments should be
cognizant of this inverse correlation between monitoring mj and the penalty factor Pj,
which can be implemented in laws and procedures. For example, increased monitoring mj
without decreasing the penalty factor Pj as shown in Figure 4a,a′ cannot be expected to
cause the household to choose a constant probability pj of tax evasion on currency j, but
can instead cause the household to choose a lower probability pj of tax evasion on currency
j since the penalty factor Pj is too high.
Second and third, the household’s probability pj of tax evasion and the government’s
taxation τj increase concavely and linearly, respectively, in the exponential tax evasion
parameter λj for each currency j. The mathematical reason can be seen from Equation (2)
where higher λj causes lower p
λj
j , since 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1, which dilutes the impact of monitoring
mj and the penalty factor Pj through the term mjτjPj p
λj
j , causing higher probability pj of
tax evasion. The government’s natural response is to tax more, which is expressed with
higher τj. The intuition is that if the government’s structure of monitoring and penalties
becomes more lenient, expressed with higher λj, the household will evade tax more, and
will face higher taxation. The policy implication is that governments should holistically
recognize the relationship between monitoring, penalties, the amount of taxation, and how
households evade tax under these conditions.
Fourth, the household’s probabilities pn and pg of tax evasion on both currencies n and
g increase in the government’s output elasticity βn for the national currency n. Furthermore,
the government’s taxation τj on both currencies decrease, and the penalty factor Pj increase,
in βn. Additionally, a high βn eventually induces the government to tax that currency n
more than the global currency g. Since higher βn means that the government identifies more
with the household, and thus becomes more altruistic, it is assumed that the household
exploits the government’s altruism through more tax evasion. Additionally, the household
enjoys less taxation, although the government eventually taxes currency n, which it values,
more than currency g, and eventually suffers higher penalties. The policy implication is
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that governments should realize that identifying too much with households, by becoming
more altruistic, and lowering taxes, with a possible objective of appeasing citizens and
ensuring reelection, might cause the households to exploit the situation by evading tax
even more.
Fifth, and similarly fourth, the household’s probability pg of tax evasion on currency
g increases in the government’s output elasticity βg. The government’s taxation τg on
currency g decreases in βg, as the government identifies more strongly with the household.
The government’s penalty factor Pg imposed on each household’s holding of currency g
increases in βg. The intuition is again that the household exploits the government’s altruism
through more tax evasion, enjoys less taxation, although eventually there is more taxation
on the currency that the government values most, and eventually suffers higher penalties.
The policy implication is again that governments should recognize the relationship between
being altruistic, being exploited through different probabilities of tax evasion on the two
currencies, and imposing adequate taxes and penalties.
Sixth, the household’s probabilities pn and pg of tax evasion on currencies n and g
decreases and increases in the government’s output elasticity γn for currency n, which
values taxation τn and penalty Pn on unsuccessful tax evasion on currency n. Furthermore,
the household is less likely to evade tax on the national currency n if the government values
taxation τn and penalty Pn, expressed with γn, on the national currency n. The results are
opposite for currency g, as shown in Sections 3 and 4. The intuition is that a higher γn,
which implies valuing taxation and penalties for tax evasion, causes the government to
be less altruistic towards the household regarding the national currency n, which causes
more taxation with a lower associated penalty factor, and less tax evasion. Intuitively,
higher γn has the opposite impact for the global currency g. The policy implication is that
governments should assess how they value taxation and penalties for tax evasion, which
impacts how households evade tax differently on national and global currencies.
Seventh and eighth, the government’s monitoring probability mj of each currency j
decreases in the unit cost aj of monitoring, counteracted by the penalty factor Pj imposed
on each household’s holding of each currency increase. This causes the tax rates τn and τg
and the household’s probabilities pn and pg of tax evasion to be constant. The intuition is
that the government compensates for a low (high) monitoring probability mj, as regulated
by the unit cost aj of monitoring, by choosing a high (low) penalty factor Pj. The model thus
predicts, for example, that if the government is less able to monitor transactions and enforce
regulations in cryptocurrencies, expressed by a high unit costs of monitoring, then it should
impose higher penalties on each household’s holding of cryptocurrencies when taxes are
evaded. Whether that happens in practice is an interesting empirical question that should
be analyzed in future research. For example, if the government’s unit cost ag of monitoring
in Figure 4g,g′ is extremely high causing the monitoring probability mg to be extremely low,
then a variety of consequences are possible. For example, the government might not be able
to impose and enforce payment of sufficiently high penalties as predicted by the model,
due to laws, regulations, and customs placing upper bounds on penalties, or households
being unable to pay excessive penalties, for example. Alternatively, households might in
practice not follow the expected utility theory when facing an extremely low monitoring
probability mg of being detected and prosecuted for tax evasion, and might choose to
ignore the probability of being monitored. The policy implication is that governments
should be cognizant of the relationship between how they choose monitoring efforts and
penalties for tax evasion, and how this relationship impacts their own taxation and the
households’ tax evasion.
6. Conclusions
This article presents a game between a government and a representative household
holding two currencies, which can generally be any two assets, subject to taxation. The two
currencies are a national currency, e.g., a CBDC and a global currency, e.g., Bitcoin, Zcash,
or Facebook’s Diem, which might have limited usage within a nation. The global currency
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might offer other opportunities, e.g., tax evasion, user autonomy, discretion, peer-to-peer
focus, no banking fees, payment on the black market, criminal activities, and potential return.
The household makes three strategic choices to maximize its Cobb Douglas expected
utility with two output elasticities associated with the two currencies. Due to the different
opportunities, usage, values, etc. provided by the two currencies, the household chooses to
hold one fraction in the national currency, and the remaining fraction in the global currency.
Additionally, the household chooses the tax evasion probability on each currency.
The government makes six strategic choices, i.e., the probability of detecting and
prosecuting tax evasion on each currency, the tax rate on each currency, and the penalty
factor imposed on each household when tax evasion is successfully detected and prosecuted
for each currency. The government has a Cobb Douglas expected utility with four output
elasticities, minus costs of choosing the monitoring probabilities. Two output elasticities
are associated with the two currencies as the government identifies with the household.
The two remaining output elasticities are due to the government benefitting from taxes and
penalties. The government incurs a cost of choosing the monitoring probability.
The article analytically determines the players’ nine strategic choices and expected
utilities. Many results are in line with logic. Some results illustrate aspects that the
governments and households should be cognizant of. The household prefers low taxation.
The government identifies partly with each household, since it is either elected by the
households or needs support from the households, but also needs income from taxation
and might receive penalty payments for detecting tax evasion. The players’ strategic
choices are closely related to their output elasticities for the two currencies, and to the
government’s output elasticities that value taxation and penalties for tax evasion.
The household’s fraction of the national currency, the government’s monitoring prob-
ability of the national currency, and the penalty factor imposed on the global currency,
increase the household’s output elasticity for the national currency. The household’s proba-
bility of tax evasion and the government’s taxation increase in the exponential tax evasion
parameter for each currency. The household’s probabilities of tax evasion on both currencies
increase in the government’s output elasticity for the national currency. The government’s
taxation on both currencies decrease in the output elasticity for the national currency.
High output elasticity for the national currency eventually induces the government to
tax that currency more than the global currency. The household’s probability of tax evasion
on the global currency increases in the government’s output elasticity for that currency.
The household is less (more) likely to tax evade on the national (global) currency if the
government values taxation and penalty on the national (global) currency. The govern-
ment’s monitoring probability of each currency decreases in the unit cost of monitoring.
The government’s penalty factor imposed on each household’s holding of each currency
increases in the unit cost of monitoring. The results are illustrated numerically where each
of eight parameter values are varied relative to a benchmark.
Future research should compile and assess empirical support for how households
and governments choose strategies for national and global currencies, and assess common
output elasticities in Cobb Douglas expected utilities for currencies. Such empirical support
should be assessed against the fractions that a representative household chooses for each
currency, and the probabilities the households choose for tax evasion on currencies. The
government’s probability of detecting and prosecuting tax evasion, the tax rate, and the
penalty factor imposed on each household when tax evasion is successfully detected and
prosecuted, should be empirically assessed for each currency.
Future research might also model more than two currencies, and additional players
such as firms, multiple governments in multiple countries, central banks, banks, and inter-
national financial institutions. Various alternatives to the players’ expected utilities might
be evaluated, i.e., backing, convenience, confidentiality, transaction efficiency, financial
stability, and security, as perceived by each player. More complexity and multiple time
periods might also be incorporated.
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Appendix A. Nomenclature
Appendix A.1. Parameters
j Currency of kind j, j = n, g.
n National currency.
g Global currency.
α The household’s output elasticity for currency n, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
1− α The household’s output elasticity for currency g, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
λj Exponential tax evasion parameter, 0 ≤ λj ≤ ∞, j = n, g.
βn The government’s output elasticity for currency n when identifying with the
household, 0 ≤ βn ≤ 1.
βg The government’s output elasticity for currency g when identifying with the
household, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
γn The government’s output elasticity for currency n when valuing taxation τn and
valuing penalty Pn on unsuccessful tax evasion on currency n, 0 ≤ γn ≤ 1.
1− βn − βg − γn The government’s output elasticity for currency g when valuing
taxation and valuing penalties on unsuccessful tax evasion, of currency g, 0 ≤ 1− βn −
βg − γn ≤ 1.
aj Unit cost of choosing the monitoring probability nj, aj ≥ 0, j = n, g.
Appendix A.2. Household’s Free Choice Variables
pj Household’s probability of tax evasion on currency j, j = n, g, 0 ≤ pj ≤ 1.
x Household’s fraction of currency n, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
Appendix A.3. Government’s Free Choice Variables
mj Government’s probability of monitoring and thus detecting and prosecuting tax
evasion on currency j, 0 ≤ mj ≤ 1, j = n, g.
τj Household’s tax rate on currency j, 0 ≤ τj ≤ 1, j = n, g.
Pj Government’s penalty factor imposed on each household’s holding of currency j
when tax evasion is successfully detected and prosecuted, j = n, g.
Appendix A.4. Dependent Variables
U Household’s expected utility.
u Government’s expected utility per household.
1− x Household’s fraction of currency g, 0 ≤ x ≤ 1.
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Appendix B. Determining the Household’s Free Choice Variables
Differentiating the household’s expected utility U in Equation (2) with respect to its























, j = n, g
0 otherwise
(A1)
which is equated with zero and solved to yield Equation (5). The second order conditions,

























, j = n, g
0 otherwise
(A2)
Differentiating the household’s expected utility U in Equation (2) with respect to its



























































, j = n, g
0 otherwise
(A4)
which are equated with zero and solved to yield Equation (6). The second order condition
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i f Pn ≤ 1−(1−pn)τnmnτn pλnn
0 otherwise
(A5)
The second order condition for pg is analogous.
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Appendix C. Determining the Government’s Free Choice Variables
Differentiating the government’s expected utility u in Equation (3) with respect to its
six free choice variables mj, τj, Pj, j = n, g, gives
N ≡
(
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×
(
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, j = n, g
0 otherwise
(A10)
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, j = n, g
0 otherwise
(A11)
Equating the first order conditions in Equations (A6)–(A11) with zero and solving





, j = n, g, is omitted in Equation (7) since it is always satisfied. It can be shown
that the second order conditions are satisfied as negative.
Appendix D. Proof of Property 1
Equations (5)–(7) constitute nine equations with the nine unknown variables x, pj, mj,






n, g, is omitted in Equation (7) since it is always satisfied, it is also omitted for x, pn and pg
in Equation (8) since it is always satisfied. The inequalities an ≥ α and ag ≥ 1− α follow
from Equation (7) when x = α. The inequality 0 ≤ λj ≤ 1, j = n, g, follows since λj > 1
would cause taxation τn > 1 in Equation (8), which is not meaningful.
Appendix E. First Order and Second Order Derivatives for Property 2
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